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A Matter of Conviction: Moral Clashes over Same-Sex
Adoption
Robin Fretwell Wilson*
I.

INTRODUCTION

In 2004 Michael and Rich Butler sued Adoption.com, the largest
Internet adoption site in the United States, after it refused to post their
profile as prospective parents1 for preview by expectant and placing
parents.2 When the Butlers asked the service why it would not post their
profile, they were told that Adoption.com ―allow[s] only individuals in
an opposite-sex marriage to post profiles on the website.‖3 Imagine the
Butlers‘ shock and dismay. Adoption had been open to same-sex couples
in California for years.4 Not surprisingly, they sued, claiming the refusal
violated ―California‘s Unruh Civil Rights Act, which prohibits
businesses from discriminating against their customers on a variety of
grounds.‖5 Adoption.com argued that no laws were violated because the
company is domiciled in Arizona, a state which ―does not prohibit
discrimination against people on the basis of marital status or sexual
orientation.‖6 The trial court that heard motions for summary judgments
*

Professor at Washington & Lee University School of Law. Garrett Ledgerwood, Nick Scannavino,
and Carolyn Hohn provided diligent, painstaking research assistance.
1. Henry K. Lee, Gay Couple Barred from Adoption Site Settle Lawsuit, S.F. CHRON., May
22, 2007, available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi (in Quick Search, type in ―Couple
Barred from Adoption Site‖ then click on ―past year‖ link).
2. See Parent Profiles Home Page, http://www.parentprofiles.com.
3. Butler v. Adoption Media, LLC, 486 F. Supp. 2d 1022, 1026 (N.D. Cal. 2007).
4. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 9000(b) (2008) (permitting second parent adoptions by registered
domestic partners); CAL. FAM. CODE § 8600 (2004) (permitting ―an adult‖ to adopt a minor child);
CAL. FAM. CODE § 8548 (2004) (allowing ―adoption of a child by a stepparent where one birth
parent retains custody and control of the child‖ but not defining a stepparent as only the spouse of
the child‘s parent); Sharon S. v. Super. Ct., 73 P.3d 554 (Cal. 2003) (permitting second-parent
adoption without regard to the marital status of the prospective adoptive parents). See generally
Butler, 486 F. Supp. 2d at 1044–45.
5. Lee, supra note 1. See generally Butler, 486 F. Supp. 2d 1022; CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 51,
51.5 (2006) (prohibiting discrimination based on sexual orientation or marital status by any business
establishment).
6. Lee, supra note 1. See generally Butler, 486 F. Supp. 2d 1022. The owners of
Adoption.com asserted that the Butlers‘ application ―was denied solely because they were not
married, and that plaintiffs were treated no differently than other unmarried couples who sought to
post their profiles on ParentProfiles.com. They also assert that the Adoption.com partnership cannot
be liable for discrimination on the basis of marital status in connection with the October 2002 denial
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in the matter concluded that fact issues existed about whether the policy
amounted to impermissible sexual orientation or gender discrimination,
or instead represented then-legal discrimination on the basis of marital
status.7
The parties subsequently settled the private litigation between them.
That settlement required in part that Adoption.com and related
organizations would not post profiles of Californians ―unless the service
is made equally available to all California residents qualified to adopt.‖8
Put to the choice to make its services available to all or to none, however,
Adoption.com chose to exit the California market. Beginning May 21,
2007, it no longer posts new profiles from California. Adoption.com also
promised within six months to phase out all profiles from California on
its website, ParentProfiles.com.9 The Butlers said of the settlement, ―We
hope that they continue doing business in the state, but if . . . they stop
doing business in the state, it‘s still a victory for Californians. We‘re not
allowing them to profit on the back of Californians.‖10
In a microcosm this case tests whether there is a duty to facilitate
same-sex adoption, or conversely, a right to refrain from participating in
a perfectly legal adoption. It highlights poignantly what is at stake when
we require one party to assist another with a deeply personal and morally
freighted matter like same-sex adoption. Clearly, some states have
invited lesbians and gays to parent for a very long time—either through
adoption11 or assisted conception.12 Same-sex couples have filled an
of plaintiffs‘ application because the Unruh Act did not prohibit marital status discrimination against
registered domestic partners until January 1, 2005.‖ Id. at 1054 (claiming the policy ―was applied
evenly and was not personal to plaintiffs‖).
7. At the time of the refusal, California‘s Unruh Civil Rights Act did not prohibit
discrimination based on martial status. It has since been amended to cover sexual orientation
discrimination. See CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 51, 51.5 (2006).
8. Transcript of Proceedings, Butler v. Adoption Media LLC, No. CO4-0135 PJH (JCS)
(N.D. Cal. May 15, 2007), at 5.
9. Id. at 7.
10. Lee, supra note 1. In 2004 the Butlers adopted a baby girl through a California agency.
11. An estimated 65,500 adopted children live with lesbian or gay parents, who ―rais[e] four
percent of all adopted children in the United States.‖ Gary Gates et al., Adoption and Foster Care by
Gay and Lesbian Parents in the United States, URBAN INST., Mar. 27, 2007, available at
http://www.urban.org/url.cfm?ID=411437. Many lesbian and gays adopt their partner‘s biological
children through second-parent adoption. See generally National Gay and Lesbian Task Force,
Second Parent Adoption in the U.S, http://thetaskforce.org/reports_and_research/second_parent_
adoption_laws (last visited April 1, 2008) (indicating that twenty-five states and the District of
Columbia permit second-parent adoption, either through statute, regulation, or court decision,
including Alabama, Alaska, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana,
Iowa, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, New Jersey, New
Mexico, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Texas, Vermont, Washington, and the
District of Columbia).
12. The field of assisted conception is largely unregulated, at least with respect to who may
conceive; in this, heterosexuals and homosexuals both are tacitly invited to conceive. This absence
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important hole in the lives of tens of thousands of children, as have many
lesbians and gays who have adopted individually. These couples have
dignitary interests in being treated like any other prospective adoptive
parents, and the state and children awaiting adoption have a stake in their
ability to adopt as well. On the other hand, this case shows that when an
organization or individual asks not to be involved, they sometimes are
put to an all-or-nothing choice. For entities like Adoption.com, the price
of ―saving [one‘s] conscience‖13 takes the form of a lost opportunity to
profit in a particular market. For individuals the cost of vindicating one‘s
conscience frequently comes at the expense of one‘s livelihood.
Viewed from the perspective of health law, the frequency and
ferocity of these moral clashes over same-sex relationships are hardly
surprising. Moral fault lines have erupted over deeply divisive healthcare
procedures since Roe v. Wade.14 The lesson from healthcare over the last
half century has been one of temperance.15 Nearly every state has carved
out a space for individuals of conscience to continue in their roles
without participating in acts that they find immoral. They do this with
conscience clauses, usually enshrined in state legislation. Much of the
insulation afforded to healthcare providers under state law, however,
began with (and continues today through) federal legislation. On the
heels of Roe, Congress prohibited courts from using the receipt of certain
federal monies to force private entities to provide controversial services.
Using its spending powers, Congress later directed state and local
governments not to punish individuals and organizations for acting on
their consciences by revoking their licenses or denying them other
important state benefits. While conscience protections obviously respond
to concerns that denominational providers and religious observers may
have, they extend beyond religious objections to encompass moral and
professional objections as well.16
of regulation mirrors the state‘s approach to those who ―reproduce naturally,‖ on whom ―there are
few restrictions.‖ Susan Apel, Access to Assisted Reproductive Technologies, 2007 EXPRESSO, at 6,
available at http://works.bepress.com/susan_apel/ (click on the title) (observing that “couples and
individuals are free to conceive under what many may deem deplorable circumstances: without
marriage, without a partner, with the assumption of many medical risks to themselves and the future
child, and even without resources, financial or other, to ensure effective childbirth and
childrearing‖). In this vacuum of regulation, providers decide individually whether to serve lesbian
and gay adults. In one survey, 74% of fertility clinics served lesbian couples. Id. (citing Judy E.
Stern et al., Access to Services at Assisted Reproductive Technology Clinics: A Survey of Policies
and Practices, 184 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 591 (2001)).
13. James Mills, I Fight On, Says Christian JP Who Quit over Gay Adoption, DAILY MAIL
(UNITED KINGDOM), Oct. 22, 2007, available at http://www.dailymail.co.uk/pages/live/articles
/news/news.html?in_article_id=489125&in_page_id=1770.
14. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
15. See infra Part II.
16. See Martha Minow, Should Religious Groups Be Exempt from Civil Rights Laws?, 48
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This essay seeks to mine the healthcare experience after Roe v. Wade
for the lessons it can offer in finding a live-and-let-live solution to moral
clashes over same-sex adoption. It seeks to acknowledge the dilemmas
facing both organizations and individuals who, as a matter of conviction,
feel that they can neither support nor participate in same-sex adoptions.17
It argues that conscience clauses offer one way to navigate the recurrent
but predictable collisions over same-sex adoption. This essay, however,
is not about who should be permitted to adopt—nowhere does it address
the merits of including lesbians and gays among potential adopters since
this topic is amply explored elsewhere.18 Instead, this essay asks whether
adoption agencies and other professionals should be able to decide whom
they will serve.
Section II describes recent moral clashes dealing with same-sex
adoption and shows that clashes occur not only between couples and
recalcitrant providers but between providers and the State, as well as
between providers and recalcitrant employees. Section III then charts the
myriad ways in which states, after Roe v. Wade, have accommodated
healthcare providers who are morally opposed to performing abortions
and other procedures. Finally, Section IV distills from this rich
experience with divisive healthcare procedures a number of guideposts
for navigating moral clashes over same-sex adoption.

B.C. L. REV. 781 (2007) (noting that religious groups have long enjoyed protection from antidiscrimination statutes, although the level of protection varies with the nature of the discrimination.
Discrimination involving sexual orientation by religious groups is implicitly exempt, while such
groups enjoy fewer exemptions regarding gender discrimination and no exemptions regarding racial
discrimination.).
17. For a more complete examination of the moral clashes hastened by same-sex marriage,
see Robin Fretwell Wilson, Matters of Conscience: Lessons for Same-Sex Marriage from the
Healthcare Context, in SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY (Anthony Picarello, Douglas
Laycock, and Robin Fretwell Wilson, eds., 2008).
18. Compare Cynthia R. Mabry, Opening Another Exit From Child Welfare for Special
Needs Children—Why Some Gay Men and Lesbians Should Have the Privilege to Adopt Children in
Florida, 18 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 269 (2006) (discussing ―[a]n array of evidence from the social
sciences and from states permitting gay and lesbian adoption [that] demonstrate that many
homosexual individuals and couples are capable of providing a healthy, loving, and supportive
environment for adopted children‖) and Carlos A. Ball & Janice Farrell Pea, Warring with Wardle:
Morality, Social Science, and Gay and Lesbian Parents, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 253 (disputing
whether research supports a finding of harm to children reared by homosexual parents) with Lynn D.
Wardle, The Potential Impact of Homosexual Parenting on Children, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 833, 894
(arguing on the basis of research findings for a rebuttable presumption that homosexual parenting is
not in a child‘s best interests) and Richard G. Wilkins, Trent Christensen, & Eric Selden, Adult
Sexual Desire and the Best Interests of the Child, 18 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 543, 546–47 (2005)
(arguing that previous studies suggesting there are ―no differences‖ in outcomes for children raised
in same-sex households are flawed and unreliable).
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II. SCOPE OF CLASHES OVER SAME-SEX ADOPTION
A number of clashes have erupted over same-sex adoption in the last
two years in the United States and abroad. Like the Butlers‘ suit, some of
these clashes have taken the form of horizontal struggles—suits between
prospective adoptive couples to force an individual or organization to
assist them in the adoption process. A far greater share represents vertical
claims between the State and a licensee or employee who asks to be
exempted from assisting with same-sex adoptions or child placements.
A poignant example of a vertical claim occurred in 2007 when
Catholic Charities of Massachusetts walked away from the adoption
business entirely after 103 years of placing children with families in
Boston.19 The organization, as a matter of policy, ceased to place
children with lesbian and gay couples20 in violation of state legislation
prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.21 Catholic
19. Patricia Wen, Catholic Charities Stuns State, Ends Adoptions, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 11,
2006, available at http://www.boston.com/news/local/articles/2006/03/11/catholic_charities_stuns_
state_ends_adoptions/ (―Catholic Charities of Boston began in 1903 as an adoption agency.‖).
20. Patricia Wen & Frank Phillips, Bishops to Oppose Adoption by Gays, BOSTON GLOBE,
Feb. 16, 2006, at A1, available at http://www.boston.com/news/local/massachusetts/articles/2006
/02/16/bishops_to_oppose_adoption_by_gays/. Catholic Charities originally allowed a handful of
gay and lesbian parents to adopt, although it is unclear whether the adopting parent was actively in a
same-sex relationship. Compare Wen, supra note 19 (finding that ―approximately 13 children had
been placed by Catholic Charities in gay households‖) with Jerry Filteau, Catholic Charities in
Boston Archdiocese to End Adoption Services, CATHOLIC NEWS SERVICE, Mar. 13, 2006, available
at http://www.catholicnews.com/data/stories/cns/0601456.htm (indicating that Catholic Charities
―had arranged the adoption of 13 children by same-sex couples over the past 20 years‖). After
reports surfaced publicly regarding the organization‘s placement of thirteen children with gay or
lesbian parents, the state‘s bishops directed Catholic agencies not to place children with gay or
lesbian parents. Wen, supra note 19. Catholic Charities‘ board previously had voted unanimously to
continue the placement of children with lesbian and gay parents. Id. The bishops overruled the
board, prompting eight members of 42-member Catholic Charities‘ board to resign. Patricia Wen, In
break from Romney, Healey Raps Gay Adoption Exclusion, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 3, 2006, at B4.
Originally, the bishops issued a public statement that they would seek ―relief from the regulatory
requirements of the Commonwealth [of Massachusetts] on this issue.‖ Statement of the
Massachusetts Catholic Conference on Behalf of Archbishop Sean P. O‘Malley (Boston), Bishop
George W. Coleman (Fall River), Bishop Timothy A. McDonnell (Springfield), and Bishop Robert
J. McManus (Worchester), http://www.thebostonpilot.com/articlearchives.asp?ID=2946. When
relief was not forthcoming, however, instead of engaging in a legal battle, Catholic Charities
discontinued its adoption services altogether. See Minow, supra note 16.
21. 102 MASS. CODE REGS. 1.03(1) (2007). Pursuant to the Code of Massachusetts
Regulations, adoption agencies must obtain a state license and comply with section 1.03(1), which
provides that ―[t]he licensee shall not discriminate in providing services to children and their
families on the basis of race, religion, cultural heritage, political beliefs, national origin, marital
status, sexual orientation or disability. A statement that the program does not discriminate on these
bases shall be made part of the written statement of purpose where required.‖ Id. (emphasis added).
This requirement ―dates back to at least 1989, when Massachusetts amended its antidiscrimination
statute dealing with employment, housing, and government services to include sexual orientation as
one of the forbidden grounds of discrimination.‖ Minow, supra note 16, at n.301.
It is not surprising that an organization would change policies mid-stream or that an
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Charities approached counsel to seek an exemption from the statute, only
to be informed the next day by then Governor of Massachusetts, Mitt
Romney, that any exemption would have to come from the legislature or
through a judicial ruling.22 Rather than bending to the State‘s will,
Catholic Charities simply folded up shop and, in the summer of 2006,
stopped placing children for adoption in Massachusetts.23 This struggle
over whether adoption agencies must serve all who ask or get out of the
adoption business is eerily reminiscent of the choice facing agencies in
the UK, which have been told to serve same-sex couples or lose all
public funding.24
Vertical claims are not limited just to facilities; they encompass
individuals as well. For individuals, who presumably will encounter a far
greater share of these clashes, the cost of honoring one‘s convictions
frequently comes at the expense of one‘s job. In 2002 Norah Ellis and
Dawn Jackson, ―highly regarded‖ social workers with the Sefton Council
Social Services Department in England, were threatened with dismissal if
they did not relent in their opposition to working with same-sex
couples.25 Their hesitance, based on their ―Christian faith,‖ surfaced in
informal conversations over coffee with one of their superiors.26 ―The
pair, who [had] more than 50 years of experience between them were
told that they faced dismissal as their attitudes contravened the council‘s
objective of ‗promoting social inclusion, equality of access and
opportunity.‘‖27 A protracted battle followed, Ellis and Jackson
threatened litigation, and the Council backed down. Despite the
Council‘s retreat, the two ultimately sought employment elsewhere.28

organization‘s leadership would veto an existing practice when it comes to their attention. With
individuals abrupt reversals may signal the strength of the conscientious objection. With
organizations it is harder to know what to make of policy reversals. Once the decision not to place
children with same-sex couples was made, however, the question of an exemption arose.
22. Patricia Wen, Bishops Dealt Setback in Pursuit of Gay Adoption Exemption, BOSTON
GLOBE, Feb. 17, 2006, at B3, available at http://www.boston.com/news/local/ (in Local Search, type
in Bishops Dealt Setback). But see Patricia Wen & Frank Phillips, Romney Shifts on Adoption by
Gays, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 1, 2006, at B1, available at http://boston.com/news/local (in ―Local
Search‖ type in ―Romney Shift on Adoption‖) (noting that the governor ―signaled new openness‖ to
consider the bishops‘ request).
23. Wen, supra note 19.
24. Patrick Wintour, Will Woodward & Stephen Bates, Catholic Agencies Given Deadline to
Comply on Same-Sex Adoptions, GUARDIAN UNLIMITED, Jan. 30, 2007, available at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2007/jan/30/children.religion.
25. David Harrison, Christian Care Workers Forced out for Opposing Gay Adoptions,
TELEGRAPH, Oct. 5, 2003, available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/
2003/05/11/nadopt11.xml&sSheet=/news/2003/05/11/ixhome.html.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
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In Great Britain resignations and threats of forced expulsion occur
regularly. Great Britain has adopted several acts in the last few years that
together make it possible for same-sex couples to enter civil partnerships
and to adopt.29 In October of 2007, Vincent and Pauline Matherick, two
―devoted foster parents with an unblemished record of caring for almost
30 vulnerable children,‖ resigned after being asked ―to sign a contract
that would require them to discuss same-sex relationships with children
as young as 11, and tell them that gay partnerships were just as
acceptable as heterosexual marriages.‖30 The Matherick‘s balked, saying
they have ―never discriminated against anybody but [they] cannot preach
the benefits of homosexuality when [they believe] it is against the word
of God.‖31 The eleven-year-old boy who has lived with the Mathericks
for two years will be placed with new foster parents.32
And the list of resignations and expulsions goes on. Andrew
McClintock, a Justice of the Peace in the UK for fifteen years, resigned
after he asked to sit out of adoption cases ―involving homosexual
applicants.‖33 The Department of Constitutional Affairs denied his
request.34 McClintock believes ―he was forced to step down‖ because
presiding over such adoptions would ―require him to set aside his deeply
held belief that children should only be brought up by heterosexual
parents.‖35 These resignations sent shockwaves through other
professional communities. Trying to get in front of the mandate to
comply or lose one‘s job, physicians in Great Britain are now
campaigning for a religious exemption for those who are uncomfortable
serving as references for same-sex couples.36
29. Civil Partnership Act, 2004, c. 33 (Eng.); Adoption and Children Act, 2002, c. 38 (Eng.);
Equality Act, 2006, c. 3 (Eng.).
30. James Mill, Foster Child To Be Taken Away Because Christian Couple Refuse to Teach
Him about Homosexuality, DAILY MAIL, Oct. 23, 2007, available at http://www.dailymail.co.uk/
pages/live/articles/news/news.html?in_article_id=489285&in_page_id=1770. (noting they ―could
also be required to take teenagers to gay association meetings.‖).
31. Id.
32. Id. In Derby, England, the Derby City Council rejected as ―unsuitable‖ a couple who had
previously fostered over 15 children. The couple, Euince and Owen Jones, charge that the Council
rejected their application ―because of their Christian beliefs.‖ When asked ―about what we would
do if the children asked about homosexuality,‖ Mrs. Jones indicated that ―she and her husband
believed homosexuality was wrong. ‗I would not lie, but, on the other hand, I did not feel it was at
all appropriate for children under ten. However, I am a Bible-believing Christian, and would want to
tell them what the Bible says.‘‖ Id.
33. Mills, supra note 13.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Sarah Womack, GP Seeks Opt-Out in Gay Adoption Cases, TELEGRAPH.CO.UK, June 2,
2007, available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk (in ―Search‖ function type ―GP seeks opt-out‖ and
then click on article); Sarah Womack, UK Doctors Seek Opt-Out in Gay Adoption Cases, LONDON
TELEGRAPH, July 2, 2007.
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Tensions over same-sex adoption parallel the clashes arising in an
almost limitless number of contexts after the legal recognition of samesex relationships. In New Jersey, a same-sex couple filed a civil rights
complaint against the Ocean Grove Camp Meeting Association, a
Methodist ministry, for denying their request to hold a civil union
ceremony in the group‘s boardwalk pavilion.37 The New Jersey
Department of Environmental Protection later denied a tax-exemption to
the group under New Jersey‘s Green Acres program. 38 In Manitoba,
Canada, twelve officials empowered to perform marriage ceremonies
―quit because they refused to perform same-sex marriages as required by
[provincial law.]‖39 In February of 2007, a seventy-year-old marriage
commissioner in Saskatchewan who refused to marry a homosexual
couple, citing his religious beliefs, was investigated by the Saskatchewan
Human Rights tribunal.40 In California an unmarried lesbian woman sued
37. See Jill P. Capuzzo, Church Group Complains of Pressure Over Civil Unions, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 14, 2007, at B4. In response to the couple‘s civil rights complaint, Ocean Grove filed
suit in federal court seeking a declaratory judgment of their rights under the First Amendment. Id.
38. John Jalsevac, U.S. Christian Camp Loses Tax-Exempt Status over Same-Sex Civil-Union
Ceremony, LIFESITE NEWS, Sept. 19, 2007, available at http://www.lifesite.net/ldn/2007/sep/
07091902.html (reporting that the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection stripped the
Ocean Grove Camp Meeting Association of its ―tax-exempt status for part of its property‖). The taxexemption arose under New Jersey‘s ―Green Acres‖ program, which is ―designed to encourage the
use of privately owned lands for public recreation and conservation.‖ Capuzzo, supra note 37
(emphasis added). In this sense, the state conditioned the property tax exemption on public access.
In contrast, at least one commentator argues that all tax-exemptions received by an organization
should be revoked or denied if that organization will not serve same-sex couples (even taxexemptions that flow from an organization‘s charitable status). See Jonah M. Knobler, Letter to the
Editor, Mass. Should Revoke Church’s Tax-Exempt Status, HARVARD CRIMSON, Mar. 17, 2006
(discussing the revocation of tax-exemption for private adoption agencies who refuse to serve samesex couples). One homosexual advocacy group believes the Ocean Grove decision ―doesn‘t go far
enough‖ and may press for ―a bigger victory . . . by having the entire tax-exemption removed.‖
Jalsevac, supra note 38.
39. Bill Graveland, Alberta Allowing Same-Sex Marriage but Adding Protection to
Opponents, CANADIAN PRESS, July 12, 2005, available at http://www.recorder.ca/cp/National/
050712/n071251A.html.
In addition to voluntary resignations, terminations have also occurred. In the Netherlands,
a registrar was dismissed after refusing for religious reasons to solemnize the wedding of a same-sex
couple, but was later reinstated by the Commissie Gelijke Behandeling, which enforces that
country‘s General Equal Treatment Act. EU Network Opinion No. 4-2005. As the Commissie
explained, insufficient reasons supported the refusal to renew the registrar‘s contract since ―other
public servants were prepared to celebrate same-sex marriages.‖ Id.
40. Memory McLeod, Knights of Columbus Aid Commissioners Who Won’t Perform Gay
Weddings: Service Club Pledges Support, THE LEADER-POST, Apr. 17, 2007, available at
http://www.canada.com/reginaleaderpost/news/sports/story.html?id=ab7789c1-5988-421d-bd3b1ade424e87b1. Although the commissioner is not a government employee and receives no pay from
the government, the complainant asked the tribunal to order him to pay her client $5000 in
compensation; the tribunal has yet to issue its decision. Id.
Similar questions arise in states that recognize civil unions. See infra (discussing a New
Jersey Attorney General opinion that requires a public official who elects to be available generally
for the purpose of solemnizing marriages, to also be available generally to solemnize civil unions).
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doctors who refused to artificially inseminate her.41
This litigation around same-sex marriage and same-sex adoption will
crop up with even greater frequency unless and until society openly
confronts the competing interests it raises. As the next Section explains,
moral clashes over abortion also took on great urgency after Roe v. Wade
and were resolved in a variety of ways.
III. RESOLVING MORAL CLASHES AFTER ROE
While Roe and Griswold v. Connecticut42 established very strong
rights for women and couples to have access to abortion and
contraceptives, their effect is limited because they established only the
right of non-interference by the state in these decisions.43 Neither
decision forced anyone to perform an abortion or provide contraceptives.
Despite that crucial limitation, abortion and family planning advocates
worked strenuously over several decades to extend these limited, noninterference rights into positive entitlements to the assistance of others in
effecting one‘s private choice.
This attempt to force providers into the abortion business took two
distinct forms: (1) attempts to force facilities to provide those services;
and (2) claims brought against individual providers to force them to
facilitate or participate in abortions, as well as sterilizations or other
procedures.
A. Protecting Facilities and Individuals from Suits by Patients
Consider first the efforts to force facilities to offer abortions. Here,
the receipt of public benefits or federal funds was the bludgeon of choice
for converting abortion from a negative right into a positive entitlement
to the assistance of others. In Taylor v. St. Vincent’s Hospital, decided
41. Refusal to Artificially Inseminate “Unmarried” Lesbian, 47 NURSING LAW‘S REGAN
REP. 7 (2005). In this high-profile case heard by the California Supreme Court, specialists at North
Coast Women‘s Health Center balked at artificially inseminating an existing patient of the practice, a
lesbian woman, allegedly because of her sexual orientation. N. Coast Women‘s Care Med. Group,
Inc. v. Super. Ct. of San Diego County, 137 Cal. App. 4th 781 (2006). Benitez‘s doctors defended
their refusal on religious grounds, claiming free exercise of religion as an affirmative defense.
Benitez brought a motion to dismiss the defense, which the trial court granted. The appeals court
reversed, concluding that there was a triable issue of fact as to whether the physicians‘ religiously
motivated refusal was based solely on Benitez‘s marital status—a permissible grounds for refusal at
the time—or whether it was based on her sexual orientation, in whole or in part. Id.
42. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
43. Maureen K Bailey, Contraceptive Insurance Mandates and Catholic Charities v. Super.
Ct. of Sacramento: Towards a New Understanding of Women’s Health, 9 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 367,
370–71 (2005) (stating that the rights established in Roe v. Wade and Griswold v. Connecticut are
negative rights).
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shortly before the U.S. Supreme Court‘s decision in Roe, a United States
District Court in Montana enjoined a private, nonprofit, charitable
hospital in Billings, Montana from refusing to perform a tubal ligation on
a patient after the birth of her child by Caesarian section.44 In Taylor v.
St. Vincent’s Hospital, the hospital prohibited Mrs. Taylor‘s physician
from surgically sterilizing her during the delivery of her baby.45 Mrs.
Taylor brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which prohibits entities
acting under color of state law from subjecting ―any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of
any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws.‖46 In denying the hospital‘s motion to dismiss for lack of
jurisdiction, ―the court stated that ‗the fact that the [hospital received
federal construction fund monies] is alone sufficient to support an
assumption of jurisdiction . . . .‘‖47 The hospital‘s tax immunity and state
license also established, in the court‘s view, a connection between the
hospital and the state sufficient to support jurisdiction.48
This receipt-of-public-benefits argument had considerable success
until Congress stepped in with the primogenitor of healthcare conscience
clauses, the Church Amendment.49 The Church Amendment prohibits a
44. 369 F. Supp. 948, 950 (D. Mont. 1973) (noting the court‘s injunction, which was ordered
Oct. 27, 1972).
45. Id. at 949.
46. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).
47. See H.R. REP. NO. 93-227 (1973), as reprinted in 1973 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1464, 1473
(discussing the preliminary injunction granted by the District Court of Montana in Taylor). The
hospital received Hill-Burton funds, which were made available to hospitals to modernize and
construct medical facilities. Hospital and Medical Facilities Amendments of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88443, 78 Stat. 447 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 291 (2000)).
48. See H.R. REP. NO. 93-227, at 1473 (describing the district court‘s finding of ―two other
factors . . . that established a connection between the hospital and the State sufficient to support
jurisdiction‖).
49. 42 U.S.C.A. § 300a-7 (West 2003). The Church Amendment appears in Section 401 of
the Health Programs Extension Act, which President Nixon signed into law in June of 1973. Pub. L.
No. 93-45, 87 Stat. 91, 95. The Church Amendment provided that:
(b) The receipt of any grant, contract, loan, or loan guarantee under the [act that created
the Hill-Burton funds and other acts] by any individual or entity does not authorize any
court or any public official or public authority to require—
(1) such individual to perform or assist in the performance of any sterilization procedure
or abortion if [it] would be contrary to his religious beliefs or moral convictions; or
(2) Such entity to—
(A) make its facilities available for the performance of any sterilization procedure or
abortion if [it] is prohibited by the entity on the basis of religious beliefs or moral
convictions, or
(B) provide any personnel for [such services] if [their performance] would be contrary to
the religious beliefs or moral convictions of such personnel.
Legislative accommodations outside healthcare date back to 1950s and ―program[s] of
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court from using receipt of certain federal monies as the basis for making
an individual or institution perform an abortion or sterilization contrary
to their ―religious beliefs or moral convictions.‖50 In effect, the Church
Amendment does not allow federal monies to be used to bootstrap a
private, not-for-profit hospital into a state actor for purposes of dictating
the kinds of services that they must provide.
Like many of the conscience clauses that have followed, the Church
Amendment protects both individual providers and facilities from
compelled participation. Importantly, it provides protection not only in
the ―horizontal relationship‖ between the patient and individual facility
or provider, but also in the ―vertical relationships‖ between individual
providers and their employers or facilities. Thus, the Church Amendment
provides that individuals cannot be punished by facilities—either for
performing a lawful abortion outside the facility or refusing to perform
one inside the facility—if abortion is against that individual‘s religious
beliefs or moral convictions. 51
Despite the Church Amendment, litigation premised on receipt of
public benefits continued for several years. The Church Amendment,
however, figured prominently in the push back of that litigation. For
example, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in
Chrisman v. Sister of St. Joseph of Peace—confronting nearly the same
facts as in Taylor—said that the Church Amendment ―was clearly
intended by Congress to prevent such suits as the one advanced‖ by the
patient.52 The Court summarily dismissed the suit for lack of
jurisdiction.53

‗released time‘ religious instruction operated by the New York public schools,‖ which the United
States Supreme Court upheld against an Establishment Clause challenge. See Ira C. Lupu & Robert
W. Tuttle, Instruments of Accommodation: the Military Chaplaincy and the Constitution, 110 W.
VA. L. REV. 89, 101–02 (2007).
50. 42 U.S.C.A. § 300a-7 (West 2003).
51. The Church Amendment provided that:
(c) No entity which receives [certain grant, contract, loan, or loan guarantees] may—
(1) discriminate in the employment, promotion, or termination of employment of any
physician of other health care personnel, or
(2) discriminate in the extension of . . . privileges to [them], because he performed . . . a
lawful sterilization procedure or abortion, [or] refused to perform [one due to] his
religious beliefs or moral convictions, or because of his religious beliefs or moral
convictions respecting sterilization procedures or abortions.
42 U.S.C.A. § 300a-7 (West 2003).
52. Chrisman v. Sisters of St. Joseph of Peace, 506 F.2d 308, 309–10 (9th Cir. 1974).
53. Id. at 310.
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B. Protecting Providers from Coercion by the Government
Just as the receipt of public benefits may be used as a wedge by
private parties to force participation, it can similarly be used by
governments to coerce hospitals and individuals to provide certain
services. This, too, happened after Roe. The kinds of benefits that
governments threatened to take off the table because of collisions over
abortion included not only state-level tax-exemptions and property taxexemptions, but also licensure, certification, and the ability to open a
facility or emergency room to the public.54 Congress responded to this
threat at the hands of the government with a number of successive pieces
of legislation designed to protect individuals from government coercion.
For example, in 1996 Danforth Amendment, Congress prohibited
federal, state, and local governments from discriminating against
healthcare entities that refuse to: (1) undergo abortion training, (2)
provide such training, (3) perform abortions, or (4) provide referrals for
training or abortions.55 None of these could be denied federal financial
assistance, or more importantly, licensure or certification that they would
have received from the state had they otherwise agreed to perform these
controversial services.56 This protection was not limited to refusals for
religious or moral reasons; it extended to refusals for any reason.
Congress put teeth into the insulation from government coercion in
2004 with the Weldon Amendment. Tucked into appropriations bills
beginning in 2004,57 the Weldon Amendment is tied to significant sums
of money. Indeed, it is the proverbial six-hundred-pound gorilla.
California alone stands to lose $49 billion in federal funds if it
impermissibly discriminates.58
54. Wilson, supra note 17.
55. 42 U.S.C. § 238n(a)(1) (2000).
56. 42 U.S.C. § 238n (2000).
57. Dep‘ts of Labor, Health & Hum. Servs., and Educ., and Related Agencies Appropriations
Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-447, § 507, 118 Stat. 2809, 3163 (2004); Pub. L. No. 109-149, § 507,
119 Stat. 2833, 2879 (2005).
Over time Congress has expanded the scope of covered services in its conscience clauses,
allowing providers to opt out of not only abortion and sterilization services but also out of providing
counseling and referral for such services. For instance, in 1988, the Danforth Amendment of the
Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987 extended conscience protections to include ―abortion-related
services.‖ Pub. L. No. 100-259, § 909, 28 Stat. 28, 29 (codified at 20 U.S.C. 1688) (providing that
the receipt of monies under Title IX, which prohibits sex discrimination in federally-funded
education programs, may not be construed to require an individual or entity to provide or pay for
abortion-related services).
58. Bob Egelko, California Suit Hits Antiabortion Amendment, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 26, 2005,
at B3. States are challenging the constitutionality of the Weldon Amendment on the grounds that
―the vague and sweeping nature of the Clause has the potential to dramatically curb women‘s access
to reproductive health care information and services.‖ Press Release, National Family Planning and
Reproductive Health Association, available at http://web.archive.org/web/20041225081812/
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The Weldon Amendment provides that no federal agency or
program, or state or local government, may receive any of the specified
funds if ―[it] subjects any institutional or individual health care entity to
discrimination on the basis that the health care entity does not provide,
pay for, provide coverage of, or refer for abortions.‖59 Importantly, there
are exceptions for rape, incest, and life-threatening pregnancies:
governments that make healthcare providers perform abortions in these
cases do not risk their federal funds.60
The Weldon Amendment also broadened significantly the kind of
entities that receive the conscience protection. Under the Weldon
Amendment, a ―‗health care entity‘ includes an individual physician or
other healthcare professional, a hospital, a provider-sponsored
organization, a health maintenance organization, a health insurance plan,
or any other kind of healthcare facility, organization, or plan.‖61
C. State Conscience Protections
Before healthcare providers received explicit legislative
accommodations, those who refused to perform controversial services
did so at great risk to themselves. Thus, individual physicians and
pharmacists have been disciplined, dismissed, sued, and retaliated
against for not going along, either with employer demands or patient
demands, with participating in abortions or other services.62 Like
www.nfprha.org/media/index.asp?ID=32 (last accessed April 1, 2008). These challenges have been
unsuccessful to date. See, e.g., Nat‘l Family Planning and Reprod. Health Ass‘n, Inc. v. Gonzales,
391 F. Supp. 2d 200 (D.D.C. 2005) (refusing to enjoin the Weldon Amendment preliminarily on
grounds that the Weldon Amendment was not unconstitutionally vague, did not violate the free
speech rights of family planning services providers, and did not impermissibly delegate legislative
power to an executive agency) vacated on other grounds and remanded by National Family Planning
and Reproductive Health Ass‘n, Inc. v. Gonzales, 468 F.3d 826 (D.C.Cir. 2006).
59. Pub. L. No. 108-447, § 508(d)(1), 118 Stat. 2809, 3163; Pub. L. No. 109-149,
§ 508(d)(1), 119 Stat. 2833, 2879–80.
60. Pub. L. No. 108-447, § 508(a) provides that:
The limitations established in the preceding section shall not apply to an abortion—(1) if
the pregnancy is the result of an act of rape or incest; or (2) in the case where a woman
suffers from a physical disorder, physical injury, or physical illness, including a life
endangering physical condition caused by or arising from the pregnancy itself, that
would, as certified by a physician, place the woman in danger of death unless an abortion
is performed.
61. Id. § 508(d)(2).
62. Firings and other disciplinary actions against pharmacists who refuse to provide
emergency contraceptives have dominated the news in recent years. See, e.g., Rob Stein, For Some,
There is No Choice, WASH. POST, July 16, 2006, at A06, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/07/15/AR2006071500790.html; Leah
Thorsen, Druggists Suspended in Debate over Pill, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Nov. 30, 2005, at A1
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Congress, state legislatures also enacted conscience clauses after Roe to
insulate providers from these harsh penalties. This subsection explores
the rich diversity of those approaches.
1. Boundaries of state conscience protections
While nearly all states have enacted conscience clauses, states
calibrate the interests of patients and providers in very different ways.
Indeed, a quick review of state conscience clauses demonstrates the
range of protection available to individuals and institutions. Three states,
Alabama, New Hampshire, and Vermont, provide no protection for
conscientious objectors. Others give providers an unfettered ability to opt
out. Eighteen states allow any hospital or person not to participate in
abortion procedures; eleven of these provide explicit statutory protection
against liability to individual providers, facilities or both.63
Other states limit the objector‘s ability to opt out. Some permit an
objection only if the invoker ―shows proof‖ or states the reasons for
objecting in writing.64 For example, California does not ―require a
(reporting that Walgreens placed four Illinois pharmacists in the St. Louis area on unpaid leave for
refusing to fill prescriptions for emergency contraception in violation of a rule imposed by Illinois
Governor Rod Blagojevich in April of 2005 that requires Illinois pharmacies that sell contraceptives
approved by the FDA to fill prescriptions for emergency birth control); Marilyn Gardner,
Pharmacist’s Moral Beliefs vs. Women’s Legal Rights, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Apr. 26, 2004, at
11, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/2004/0426/p11s01-usju.html (reporting that a K-Mart
pharmacist faced disciplinary hearings in Wisconsin after refusing to fill or transfer a woman‘s
prescription for birth-control pills on the basis on the pharmacist‘s religious beliefs).
Some states explicitly protect the decision of a pharmacist or pharmacy to refuse to stock
or dispense emergency contraceptives, following the traditional model of protecting a right of
conscientious refusal. These include Arkansas, Georgia, Mississippi, and South Dakota. See David
A. Hyman & Robin Fretwell Wilson, Health Care Regulation: The Year in Review, The Searle
Center Annual Review of Regulation, May 4, 2007, at 4, available at
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/searlecenter/papers/Hyman_Wilson_Annual_Rev_Final.pdf.
However, ―more states have mandated the provision of emergency contraceptives, either by statute,
executive order, or pharmacy board regulation.‖ Id. Over twenty states are still considering what
action, if any, to take. Id.
63. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-16-601(a) (2005); CONN. AGENCIES REGS. § 19-13-D54(f)
(2005); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 1791 (2005); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 390.0111(8) (West 2002); HAW.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 453-16(d) (LexisNexis 2005); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-34-1-4 (LexisNexis 1993);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 146.1 (West 2005); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-443 (2002); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 22, §§ 1591, 1592 (2004); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.20181 (West 2001); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 145.414 (West 2005); MO. ANN. STAT. § 197.032 (West 2004); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-5-2
(LexisNexis 2003); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-45.1(e), (f) (2005); N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-16-14 (2002);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4731.91 (LexisNexis 2003); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3213(d) (West
2000); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34- 23A-11 (1994); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34- 23A-12 (1994); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 39-15-204 (2003); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35-6-106 (2005). Of these, Arkansas,
Delaware, Kansas, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New Mexico, North Carolina,
Pennsylvania, and Wyoming give explicit statutory protection against liability to individuals,
hospitals, or both.
64. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-2151 (2003); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-6-104 (West
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physician [or other healthcare provider] to directly participate in the
induction or performance of an abortion if [that person] has filed a
written statement with the employer or the hospital, facility, or clinic
indicating a moral, ethical, or religious basis for refusal to participate in
the abortion.‖65
Some states only require conscientious objectors to provide notice to
the patient beforehand.66 Pennsylvania is one such state, allowing
objections to abortion or sterilization ―made freely available and
conspicuously posted for public inspection.‖67
Some conscience clauses simply mimic the protection afforded by
the Church Amendment. Wisconsin requires no individual or entity to
participate in or make its facilities available for abortion contrary to
religious beliefs or moral convictions because of ―the receipt of any
grant, contract, loan or loan guarantee under any state or federal law.‖68
But many of these clauses also shield providers from punishment at the
hands of the state and local government, as the Weldon Amendment
does.69 For instance, in Montana, ―[the] refusal by any hospital or health
care facility or person [to provide advice] shall not be grounds for loss of
any privileges or immunities . . . or for the loss of any public benefits.‖70
2. Contests between individual providers and their employers
Similar to the Church Amendment, many state conscience clauses
address an individual‘s risk of coercion by her employer. Some even
prohibit employers from asking prospective employees about refusals to
participate. Any public or private employer in Illinois cannot ―orally
question . . . any applicant . . . on account of the applicant‘s refusal to . . .
participate in any way in any form of health care services contrary to his

2004); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-12-142 (2003); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-612 (2004); 720 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. 510/13 (West 2003); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.800(4) (West 2005); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § 12I (West 2003); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-20-111 (2005); N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS
LAW § 79-i (McKinney 1992); 43 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 955.2 (West 1991); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 18.2-75 (2004); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-17-11 (1996) (providing an exception for scheduled
abortions only).
65. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 123420(a) (West 1996).
66. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 123420(c) (West 1996); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-337
(1995); OR. REV. STAT. § 435.475(1) (2003); OR. REV. STAT. § 435.485(2) (2003) (allowing
physicians to refuse to give patients information about an abortion, but the physician must let the
patient know about the refusal).
67. 16 PA. CODE §§ 51.31–51.32 (2005).
68. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 253.09(4) (West 2004).
69. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.33(C) (2001); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112,
§ 12I (West 2003); MO. ANN. STAT. § 197.032(2) (West 2004).
70. MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-20-111 (2005).
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or her conscience‖ on an application form.71
Other states recognize that individual refusal can place a burden on
an employer. In these states, employees hired for the express purpose of
performing a specific service are not exempted, nor are employees who
work for facilities that exclusively provide abortions.72 In Kentucky if a
healthcare facility is not ―operated exclusively for the purpose of
performing abortions,‖ it may not discriminate against a person for
refusing to participate in an abortion procedure.73
Other states limit this encroachment on individual consciences to
situations in which employers will experience an undue hardship as a
result.74 For example, Missouri allows for lawful discrimination against a
person who refuses to participate in an abortion if, in accommodating
that refusal, it poses a hardship on the business or enterprise.75
Importantly, these clauses sometimes accommodate matters of
conscience in both directions. Take, for example, the ―renegade‖
physician who performs abortions outside a Catholic hospital but wants
privileges within it. This physician may be concerned about being denied
privileges at the Catholic hospital. California has solved this dilemma by
providing that a person associated with a medical facility that does not
permit abortion ―may not be subject to any penalty or discipline on
account of the person‘s participation in the performance of an abortion‖
in another facility.76
The right to refuse has been extended by some states to include
grounds other than religion or morality. For example, Pennsylvania
provides that no facility can be made to permit an abortion ―contrary to
its stated ethical policy‖ and allows individuals the right to refuse on
―professional grounds.‖77 Some states, such as Indiana, limit the ability
to refuse only to denominational hospitals.78 Others have expanded the
71. 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 70/7 (West 2002).
72. See 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 70/13 (West 2002); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3213
(West 2000).
73. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.800 (5)(c) (West 2005).
74. See 16 PA. CODE § 51.51 (2000) (allowing a facility that provides abortions to seek a
temporary exemption to the conscience clause protections).
75. MO. ANN. STAT. § 188.105 (West 2004).
76. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 123420 (West 1996); see also MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 333.20184 (West 2001); TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. § 103.002 (b) (Vernon 2004).
77. 43 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 955.2 (West 1991). Compare id. with N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW
§ 79-i (McKinney 1992).
78. IND. CODE ANN. § 16-34-1-3 (LexisNexis 1993); see also IOWA CODE ANN. § 146.2
(West 2005); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.800 (3) (West 2005); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 65A-2 (West
2000) (case law limits application of the statutory exemption to denominational hospitals); OR. REV.
STAT. § 435.475(3) (2003); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-41-40 (2002); TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. § 103.004
(Vernon 2004); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-306 (2003); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.02.150 (West
2003); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35-6-105 (2005).
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right to refuse even to insurers and other healthcare entities.79 Minnesota
does not require any ―health plan company . . . or health care
cooperative . . . to provide coverage for an abortion.‖80
3. The possibility of hardships for patients
The ability to opt out raises the possibility of hardships for patients.
This possibility has factored into how much insulation many states
provide.81 Patently forcing people to act against their consciences when a
hardship will not occur needlessly treads on their moral or religious
beliefs with no countervailing gain. On the other hand, patients need
access to services, especially in emergencies. Balancing both interests,
some states limit the ability to refuse only to non-emergencies.82 Nevada
does this, for example, by not requiring a ―hospital or other medical
facility . . . which is not operated by the state or a local government or an
agency of either . . . to permit the use of its facilities for the induction or
performance of an abortion, except in a medical emergency.‖83
A number of commentators—worried about access to needed
services—go one step further and argue that an invoker should only be
allowed to object when she does not pose a ―road block‖ to the patient‘s
ability to access the desired service from another provider. They argue
that providers should facilitate the patient‘s ability to get the service from
another provider.84 At least one jurisdiction explicitly rejects such a
duty, however. A licensed hospital in Maryland ―may not be required to

79. See MO. ANN. STAT. § 376.1199(1) (West 2002).
80. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.414 (West 2005).
81. Critics of conscience clauses lament that in many rural and traditionally conservative
areas, the next closest pharmacy or hospital is miles away and not easily accessible. Adam Sonfield,
New Refusal Clauses Shatter Balance Between Provider “Conscience,” Patient Needs, THE
GUTTMACHER REPORT, Aug. 2004, available at http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/tgr/07/3
/gr070301.pdf.
Recognizing that access issues are the dark underside of conscience clauses, some
professional pharmacy groups believe we should do more to direct patients to willing providers. The
American Pharmaceutical Association ―recognizes the individual pharmacist‘s right to exercise
conscientious refusal and supports the establishment of systems to ensure patient access to legally
prescribed therapy without compromising the pharmacist‘s right of conscientious refusal.‖
AMERICAN PHARMACISTS ASSOCIATION, 2004 HOUSE OF DELEGATES, REPORT OF THE POLICY
REVIEW COMMITTEE, available at http://www.aphanet.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Search&
section=About_APhA1&template=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentFileID=224.
82. See MO. ANN. STAT. § 376.1199(1) (West 2002); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 44-41-40, -50
(2002); TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. § 103.004 (Vernon 2004).
83. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 449.191 (LexisNexis 2004).
84. Commentators in the New England Journal of Medicine‘s Sounding Board have urged
that the objecting pharmacist should be required to find a willing provider. Julie Kantor & Ken
Baum, The Limits of Conscientious Objection—May Pharmacists Refuse to Fill Prescriptions for
Emergency Contraception?, 351 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2008, 2008–12 (2004).
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permit, within the hospital, the performance of any medical procedure
that results in artificial insemination, sterilization, or termination of
pregnancy; or to refer to any source for these medical procedures.‖85
Significantly, protections for conscience need not come at the
expense of access. In addition to hardship exceptions, informationforcing rules—that is, rules that require refusing parties to direct patients
to others who will perform the service—allow protection for matters of
conscience without sacrificing access. States have capitalized on this
approach with emergency contraceptives. For example, Illinois requires
pharmacies that do not carry emergency contraceptives to post a sign
directing patients to others that do.86
In sum, states have structured legislative accommodations in
different ways to provide greater or lesser protection for persons who
object to performing a service.
IV. NAVIGATING MORAL CLASHES OVER SAME-SEX ADOPTION
The parallels between the clashes over abortion and same-sex
adoption are so striking that policymakers would be remiss not to draw
on the abortion experience in deciding how to approach same-sex
adoption. What can policymakers distill from our nearly half century of
experience with deeply divisive healthcare procedures? This Section
offers four primary guideposts: first, legislatures need to prevent
adoption agencies and professionals from exiting the market; second,
legislatures need to step in to curb litigation; third, reasonable limitations
should be placed on exemptions to avoid predictable hardships to samesex couples; and fourth, providing an exemption only if a hardship will
not result best respects the interests of parties on both sides of this moral
divide.
A. Preventing Exodus From the Market
Faced with the inability to opt-out, agencies and professionals have
already left the adoption market. It bears repeating that providers are not
captives of the state and need not continue to provide services. When put
to an all-or-nothing choice, many have chosen nothing. Conscience
clauses offer states one way to avoid such high stakes. The uncertainty
created by a failure to speak clearly here hurts not only providers but
prospective adopters as well, both homosexual and heterosexual. As the

85. See MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 20-214(b)(1)(i)–(ii) (Lexis Nexis 2005).
86. See 68 Ill. Admin. Code 1330.91(k) (2006).
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number of providers in the market shrinks, so too does the number of
children that can reasonably be placed.
Indeed, failing to act can only impose additional hardships on
children awaiting adoption. The exodus of Catholic Charities from
Massachusetts‘ adoption market demonstrates this risk most poignantly.
Catholic Charities placed more than 720 children for adoption over the
span of two decades, many of them the hardest to place children.87 The
agency‘s exit forced other agencies to absorb the placement of those
children and may have lengthened the waiting time for children. The
Boston Globe predicted that after Catholic Charities‘ departure, ―[f]oster
children could face longer waits in an already backlogged system, and
specialists say other agencies will have to scramble to pick up the
Catholic Charities‘ caseload. Whether they can replace its network of
seasoned, caring social workers is another question.‖88 One placement
agency director called the outcome ―a shame because it is certainly going
to mean that fewer children from foster care are going to find permanent
homes.‖89 In this all-or-nothing gambit, Catholic Charities lost,
prospective adoptive parents lost, and so did many children in
Massachusetts.90 Driving providers from the market who may have been
able to continue in their roles with a legislative exemption impoverishes
the whole enterprise.
Many will chafe at the idea that in a liberal democracy the state
would accommodate religious or moral concerns over same-sex
adoption, which is itself a deeply personal matter. Yet as Professor
Minow observes, accommodating religious groups promotes certain
liberal values.91 For example, without accommodation, we might see a
strangling of religion by the state. Moreover, suppressing one set of
religious ideas may be offensive to all Americans who view themselves
as religious; this ―united front‖ needs to be considered when society
decides whether and how much accommodation to give. 92
As the next subsection explains, if legislatures fail to candidly
resolve this moral clash through legislation, the boundaries of any right
to refrain will necessarily be resolved—slowly and expensively—in suit
after suit.

87. See Michael Levenson, Workers Rush to Fill Void Left by Boston Agency’s Decision,
BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 11, 2006, available at http://www.boston.com/news/local/articles/2006/03/
11/workers_rush_to_fill_void_left_by_boston_agencys_decision/.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Minow, supra note 16.
92. Id.
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B. Curbing Litigation
Just as the recognition of abortion rights after Roe ushered in a wave
of litigation, so will same-sex adoption if legislatures fail to decide ex
ante whether there is a duty to assist, or, conversely, a right to refrain.
Indeed, the Introduction to this essay suggests that we are now seeing the
leading edge of litigation designed to resolve these competing claims.93
Legislatures can deflect a torrent of litigation by deciding these
questions now, as they ultimately did with fractious healthcare services.
Indeed, conscience clauses figured prominently after Roe in turning back
later waves of suits pressing the same arguments rejected by the Church
Amendment.94
C. The Need for Reasonable Limitations on Exemptions
One pivotal question states must address regarding same-sex
adoption is whether a legislative exemption would erect a significant
barrier to a same-sex couple‘s ability to adopt. This is especially
important since many states have invited same-sex couples to parent,
either through adoption or assisted conception. Here, our experience with
emergency contraceptives shows that permitting conscientious refusals
need not bar access to adoption. Instead, information-forcing rules could
direct prospective parents to willing providers.
In deciding whether to give conscience protections, states should
consider a number of subsidiary questions:95 What impact would a
legislative exemption have on same-sex couples seeking to adopt?
Specifically, what percentage of the market of prospective adopters are
93. There is a long history of litigation between secularists and religious institutions when the
later fulfills a traditional state role, as with education, adoption, and other social services. See
generally Ira C. Lupu & Robert Tuttle, The Distinctive Place of Religious Entities in Our
Constitutional Order, 47 VILL. L. REV. 37 (2002) (outlining a history of important litigation defining
the boundaries of the First Amendment Separation Clause).
94. For instance, in Chrisman v. Sisters of St. Joseph of Peace, a married woman sued for a
writ of mandamus and injunction against a private, nonprofit hospital that refused to do a tubal
ligation for her. 506 F.2d 308 (9th Cir. 1974). She alleged that the hospital acted under color of state
law since it received Hill-Burton construction funds, enjoyed some state tax-exemption, and was
generally under state regulation. Id. at 310. In affirming the district court‘s dismissal, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit noted that ―this argument has been seriously limited by
[Congress‘s] action‖ in the Church Amendment, which ―was clearly intended by Congress to prevent
suits such as that advanced by Appellant.‖ Id.
95. It is worth noting that Federal legislation introduced by Representative Barney Frank and
others to end discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation includes a religious exemption. See,
e.g., Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2007, H.R. 2015, 110th Cong. § 6 (2007) (exempting
―any of the employment practices of a religious corporation, association, educational institution, or
society which has as its primary purpose religious ritual or worship or the teaching or spreading of
religious doctrine or belief‖).
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same-sex couples? What percentage of adoption agencies are likely to
object to serving them? Will other adoption agencies fill their needs?
Here it is worth noting anecdotally that some adoptions agencies
explicitly advertise themselves as gay- and lesbian-friendly sites.96
States should also explore what impact this approach would have on
children awaiting adoption. States should assess, among other things,
what would happen under an all-or-nothing regime. Specifically, if the
state rejects conscience protections, will objecting agencies exit the
market? If so, how many kids would they have placed and how many of
these would be picked up by other agencies in the void left behind by
their exit? Will the time frame for their placement lengthen as agencies
depart the market? Do the exiting agencies serve the hardest-to-place
children?
In deciding how to proceed, legislatures should critically evaluate the
variety of approaches taken with respect to healthcare services. Some
legislative accommodations, like the Church Amendment, insulate
providers from suits by patients and from coercion by employers or
facilities. Some, like the Weldon Amendment, insulate providers from
coercion by the government itself. Conscience clauses can also exempt
institutional providers and individual providers, but need not do both.
Thus, a state could exempt individual workers but not agencies, or it
could exempt only agencies, in which case it likely would not need to
exempt individual workers. Professor Minow argues that states should be
loath to hand out exemptions to both organizations and individuals. As
she explains, ―each additional exemption curtails the application of the
overarching norm—and civil rights laws as a result can be too easily and
thoroughly undermined.‖97 As the next subsection explains, states should
examine in particular the possibility that any conscience protection will
create hardships for same-sex couples wishing to adopt.
D. The Prospect of Hardships
States calibrate in very different ways the competing interests of
providers and those seeking a service. Some endorse complete unfettered
discretion to refuse; others carefully circumscribe the circumstances in
which providers can refuse. Many states provide an exemption only
when it poses no hardship to the individual requesting the service—in
effect respecting religious and moral objections when no one would
96. See, e.g., Independent Adoption Center, http://www.adoptionhelp.org; A Child‘s Waiting,
http://www.achildswaiting.com/adoptive_parents/adoption_questions/;
Open
Adoption,
http://www.openadopt.org /index.php; Adopt a Special Kid, http://www.aask.org/.
97. Minow, supra note 16.

496

BYU JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW

[Volume 22

otherwise lose. For some, a ―hardship‖ rule for exemptions presents a
lose-lose scenario: objectors will still be offended by facilitating samesex adoptions in cases of hardship, and same-sex couples will find cold
comfort in the fact that they receive equal access, but only when a
hardship would otherwise result. It may be, however, the best we can
hope for in a pluralistic society that prizes both religious liberty and the
desire to parent.
States considering a hardship approach with respect to same-sex
adoption should ask a number of questions: (1) How many different
agencies in the state can facilitate an adoption, and how many would
exercise an exemption? (2) Do adoption agencies now segment the
market, helping some prospective adopters but not others (for example, a
Muslim adoption agency placing Muslim children with Muslim
families)? (3) How likely is it that every adoption agency in a given area
will assert a moral objection?98 In such instances, these foreseeable
denials would clearly pose a hardship for the couple.
(4) Will the ability to opt out bar access by same-sex couples to
adoption altogether? Here, states should consider the role of Internet
adoption sites. They should also consider the ease or difficulty of
adopting across state lines, which some states discourage. States should
also consider whether prospective adopters will lose the ability to adopt
infants or other children they would see as desirable, including children
to whom they may have developed an emotional attachment. To the
extent that the couple cannot easily adopt outside their home state, and
no one will serve them within the state, allowing for conscientious
objections without addressing hardships is tantamount to prohibiting a
couple from adopting.
(5) Will same-sex couples experience hardships other than a lack of
access? It seems possible that hardships may result in particular cases as
well as systemically. Consider an agency that begins to serve an
individual whom they later learn is in a same-sex relationship, and only
then does the agency balk. Or consider an individual caseworker who
asks to be exempted from assisting a same-sex couple but drags her feet
or otherwise acts as a roadblock when other caseworkers would gladly
serve the clients‘ needs. Here, states may want to tie an exemption to a
duty to transfer the case and step aside. A transfer may be the only
equitable solution when the couple has sunk a lot of time and money into
98. Despite the possibility of hardship, locales in which every agency or nearly every agency
will claim a moral objection should not occur very often. A number of adoption agencies now offer
services to same-sex couples and advertise themselves explicitly as gay and lesbian friendly sites.
See, e.g., Independent Adoption Center, http://www.adoptionhelp.org; A Child‘s Waiting,
http://www.achildswaiting.com/adoptive_parents/adoption_questions/;
Open
Adoption,
http://www.openadopt.org/index.php; Adopt a Special Kid, http://www.aask.org/.
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an adoption in the form of agency fees or the cost of a home study—not
to mention their emotional investment.
V. CONCLUSION
The question posed by moral clashes over same-sex adoption is not
whether same-sex couples should parent—clearly same-sex couples are
now parenting—but whether private adoption agencies may help some
but not all prospective parents. Deciding when, if ever, it is acceptable
for providers to refrain from facilitating an adoption will stave off a wave
of litigation and years of uncertainty. For this reason alone, new
legislation resolving the question is warranted. But addressing this matter
of conviction forthrightly serves another end as well: ensuring that
providers of adoption placement and other services continue in their
important roles. Left with all-or-nothing choices, many providers have
chosen nothing.
Far from offering only black-and-white, all-or-nothing outcomes,
conscience clauses permit states to accommodate both the interests of
those who want a service and those who have moral objections to
providing it. With information-forcing rules and hardship provisions,
states can preserve the dignitary and parenting interests of same-sex
couples without reflexively dismissing the religious or moral objections
of providers.

